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The end of the XXth century, with its 
digital technologies, has greatly hastened 
the pace, at which the industrial system of 
organizing work and life around factory 
mass production (referred to further as in-
dustrialism), was losing its importance in 
economic activity and our everyday life. 
At the height of its day it was the main-
stream of people’s life and work, now in 
OECD countries it is increasingly being 
marginalized.
Between 1980 and 2006 the United 
States economy added some 20 million 
jobs in the creative, professional, and 
knowledge sectors of the economy9). Wag-
es from these jobs amount to half of all 
US wages9). The same trend can be found 
in the economies of other OECD coun-
tries, where “creatives” (i.e. those working 
in and for the creative economy) make up 
to 40% of the workforce32). This is a re-
flection of a wider shift, which takes place 
from an economy based on making things 
to one that revolves around creativity and 
knowledge, access22) and experiences20). 
This shifting pattern of employment 
prompted studies and theorization about 
the importance of the creative class, and 
its role in economic development. We 
will here focus on just two paramount as-
pects of these historical processes, which 
change the way we live: on its temporal 
and spatial dimension. In social sciences, 
whenever the temporal order of the so-
cial mainstream is drastically changed, 
this suggests a revolutionary change in 
the organization of production and social 
life. Such was the case of transition from 
hunters/gatherers’ economy and society 
to agriculture, from agricultural era to 
medieval times, and the transition from 
medieval times to the industrial economy. 
What does it look like in practice? 
There is growing evidence from cultural 
anthropology, sociology of work, econom-
ics of work and leisure sciences pointing 
to far-reaching changes in the availability 
and management of time. The society of 
hunters25) and gatherers worked on the 
average 60-80 days a year. In the days of 
the Roman Empire an important number 
of days-off, such as holidays of local dei-
ties and gentry, were seen as a hindrance 
to many activities including the conduct 
of war, marriages and celebrations. This 
tendency reached its peak in the medieval 
days, when the number of religious holi-
days and feasts of local patrons surpassed 
the number of working days4). This was 
seen as one of the main obstacles to in-
creasing the output of guilds, which were 
than the dominant force of production. 
In short, the number of holidays and lei-
sure associated with it became a barrier to 
production and to economic growth in 
general. The medieval temporal order had 
to be abolished to make time for increased 
industrial output. 
This industrial production required all 
production factors to be gathered in one 
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place at the same time, hence what was at 
this time required was strict observance of 
mechanical linear clock time (as opposed 
to cyclical time of agriculture or religious 
cycles of the Middle Ages), with the stress 
on punctuality and time discipline, a 
message still firmly rooted in “Western” 
business education and practice. The sys-
tem of mass industrial production was not 
flexible; it had to follow a strict techno-
logical regime of manufacturing within a 
rigid timeframe. With the coming of the 
Industrial Revolution, someone born in 
the middle of 19th century on the average 
would spend one third of his life in work. 
However, over the last 150 years the an-
nual average time of work in industrial-
ized economies fell from 3000 hours to 
1700 hours, but this time of work has be-
come much more productive2). 
In the middle of the 20th century jobs 
in the manufacturing sector were among 
the most desired. While often backbreak-
ing and tedious they carried a promise 
of high reward: decent wages, protection 
from the trade unions, generous benefits 
and unimaginable security. In the golden 
industrial era millions of industrial work-
ers were able to put in their time and then 
retire on their pensions. 
The number of industrial factory 
jobs has been decreasing since the 1950s. 
Many of the jobs have been automated 
or outsourced, and are not ever coming 
back. The recent economic crisis in the 
US alone has eliminated more than 7 mil-
lion jobs. 
Under the pressure of growing produc-
tivity, trade unions and labor regulation, 
the duration of the working week contin-
ued to fall until late 1980s. As develop-
ment of trade unions, better organization 
of work and technological innovation civ-
ilized industrialism, gains in productivity 
earned through technological and man-
agement advances were expected to lead 
to a situation, in which productivity levels 
would reach such heights that nearly the 
whole industrial labor force could afford 
to work on a part-time basis (this was the 
essence of the debate on post-industrial 
societies characteristic of the 1960s and 
1970s)1,7). Thus, the availability of time 
coupled together with higher incomes 
would allow for increased consumption. 
This consumption was becoming more 
personalized (de-massification of indus-
trial economies and societies), and direct-
ed to the growing sector of personal ser-
vices which would free us from the part of 
everyday obligations and chores, such as 
cooking meals, cleaning and child-care, 
family and other household obligations. 
The coming of the ‘leisure society’ seemed 
unstoppable.
The decomposition of 
industrialism’s temporal order
The economic downturn of the 1980s 
has again reversed this trend and chal-
lenged the leisure society concept. While 
a growing army of the unemployed had 
much idle time available, in the UK the 
workweek of the management was clearly 
extended (41% of the managers worked 
over 50 hours a week, 13% worked over 
60 hours, and 53% of them once or twice 
a month worked over the weekends). On 
the whole, the number of work hours of 
management staff in the OECD countries 
grew by 20%.
 This growth in work time has had its 
price. According to the ILO in the UK 
stress at work is alone responsible for loss-
es equal to 10% of the British GNP. By 
early 1990s sick leave for diseases related 
to stress compared to the 1950s grew by 
500%. On the average (by1989/1990) 18 
million of workdays were lost due to nerv-
ous breakdowns caused by stress. Every 
year in Japan some 10 thousand people 
die from overexhaustion caused by work. 
Total annual cost of accidents caused by 
overexhaustion in the United States was 
equal to 60 billion USD, and on the world 
scale – to 80 billion USD. The scope of 
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shift work, or crude system of work flexi-
bilization in industrialism, also has its 
tangible social consequences – the rate 
of divorce is 2 to 8 times higher than for 
those who work without shifts2).
 This hasty work schedule is also eating 
into our sleep time. In the 1980s on the 
average time spent on sleeping and eating 
was half an hour less than in the 1960s. 
In the UK leisure time of men working 
full-time fell by 4% in the years 1985-93, 
for women it was even more –10%. Lei-
sure time has also become much more a 
consumption time with a notable growth 
of time spent on shopping. From the early 
1960s the amount of time spent on shop-
ping and travelling to shopping increased 
from 40 min. to 70 min. per day or on 
the average – three hours per week23). 
Shopping and engaging in various activi-
ties also spilled into the weekends. Even 
though a number of time-saving inven-
tions became a standard household good, 
i.e. mobile phones, Internet shopping etc., 
in practice the amount of time spent on 
these activities proved to be yet another 
drain on our valuable time resources. Ac-
cording to Jupiter research survey con-
ducted in 2006, mean weekly time for 
Internet use (14 hours) was comparable to 
time of TV viewing, hitherto the single 
most important element of leisure time, 
and was much more than time devoted to 
reading magazines, newspapers or listing 
to the radio16).
Thus, in the late 80s a new trend began 
to emerge in the world’s leading econo-
mies. After nearly a century of uninter-
rupted decrease in the duration of work 
time (with the exception of the two world 
wars), leisure time started to shrink and 
work-time was increasing again, like in 
the early days of the industrial revolution. 
There also emerged new forms of work 
which were quickly gaining popularity: 
a fusion of production and consumption 
known as Toffler's prosumption35) and 
highly committed and intense serious 
leisure (hobbies) activities, as described 
by Stebbins28). It was good three decades 
before the explosion of voluntary and 
non-remunerated activity and creativity, 
now associated with Web 2.0 era, where 
billions of people are actively contributing 
to the resources of the Internet by produc-
ing what is known as “user-generated con-
tent” (UGC)15).
In the first decade of the new millen-
nium, these changes crystalized in new 
modes of production and new lifestyles. 
These modes of production are broadly 
referred to as ‘wikinomics’, or a system 
of networked collaborative production by 
peers and driven mainly by intrinsic mo-
tivation31). Another development has been 
the conceptualization and analysis of the 
so-called ‘creative economy’ and ‘creative 
class’, which embody and epitomize new 
ways of work largely free from legacy of 
the industrial era10, 14). The requirements 
of creative work are very disruptive to the 
industrial work model and modern infor-
mation companies, such as Google when 
starting anew are faced with the chal-
lenge of redefining work expected from 
their employees. The consequence of this 
change go much deeper because in the 
OECD countries by the first decade of the 
third millennium nearly 1/3 of the labor 
force was in creative jobs and this part of 
labor force continues to grow, being large-
ly insensitive to downturns of the world 
economy19). When seen together with the 
emergence of new business models arising 
from the digital economy, this develop-
ment of the creative economy calls for a 
new set of skills to be developed through 
the educational system, which is still, 
by virtue of its enlightenment heritage, 
deeply entrenched in industrialism. The 
creative economy needs non-conformism 
and individuality usually suppressed by 
schools24). What seems to be needed for 
the third millennium is non-standardized 
artistic and flexible minds, capable of 
unique problem-solving and not routine 
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jobs, the number of which is shrinking 
fast. The work of these creative people is 
task-based, not presence based. This work 
doesn't have any fixed time frames other 
than meeting the deadlines for projects.
A yet another work paradox came from 
further flexibilization of work and work 
schedules, particularly in urban areas. 
The concept of the “24-hour economy” 
and “24 hour city” in practice meant, that 
more and more people worked during 
weekends and at nights2). According to the 
data from the British labor market, 60% 
of employed men and 45% of employed 
women usually occasionally worked at 
nights, also 28% of working men work 
for more than 48 hours per week, against 
22% in 1982. The percentage of people 
working on night shifts also increased 
in the years 1981-91. Even though in the 
United States 1.8 million job posts in the 
industrial inflexible working schedules 
was suppressed, the percentage of Ameri-
cans complaining about living in a hurry 
increased from 24% in 1965 to 37% in 
1992. Work time has also spilled into 
holidays: 44% of those employed in the 
UK report that they take less holidays and 
77% reports that they contact with the 
employer while on holiday. Holiday time 
is also increasingly harried and subject to 
tight planning.
 S. Lindner was one of the first econo-
mists to draw attention to time deficit be-
ing a barrier to consumption in a devel-
oped market economy18). He wrote about 
three possible forms of accelerating con-
sumption to overcome this barrier of time: 
(1) consumption of more expensive goods, 
(2) simultaneous consumption, and (3) 
successive consumption or consumption 
of goods and services one after the other, 
but more rapidly. In 1972 a German soci-
ologist E. Scheuch used the term „time-
deepening” by analogy to deepening the 
capital. He noticed that if a consumer 
could do several things at once, he would 
be able to fit more things into his daily 
schedule. J. Robinson and G. Godbey de-
veloped the concept of „time-deepening” 
with relation to leisure23). They wrote 
about the quickened pace of conducting 
activities (i.e. about sightseeing without 
leaving the car), switching to time-saving 
substitutes (ordering a take away meal in-
stead of cooking at home), associating pri-
mary activities with a growing number of 
secondary activities (such as eating a meal 
while watching television and listening 
to the music), and applying a much more 
disciplined approach to time use even in 
relation to pleasures of life (more detailed 
planning).
This harried consumption was also de-
scribed by O. Sullivan and J. Gershuny, 
who were pointing to some prestigious 
consumption items related to lifestyle, 
such as the purchase of holiday home in 
faraway places or a new pair of skis and 
ski outfits, while in their owners’ lives 
there was no time to enjoy them29).
J. Schor explained the causes behind 
more work and professional commit-
ments undertaken by American house-
holds to gain additional incomes, to pay 
for expanding consumption expenditures 
and purchases of more household be-
longings after World War II. The average 
American home is now twice as big as at 
the end of the 1940s, with twice the space 
per person, while 10 million Americans 
have two or more homes. Consumption 
expenditures from personal incomes also 
doubled in the real terms. In the 1990s 
the price for this was growing stress and 
hurry, chronic lack of time, especially of 
leisure time26, 27). 
As life of the creative class becomes 
better researched and documented, it ap-
pears those typical weekly work times of 
60-70 hours are a norm, rather than an 
exception. Furthermore, the creative class 
is reported to devote as much as one third 
of their leisure time to various forms of 
training and upgrading/updating their 
knowledge and competences10).
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Some aspects of the spatial 
compression 
This line of thinking is debated by 
postmodern social theory and its contri-
bution to the perception of time/space 
compression characteristic of modern 
times. Sticking to the world of work and 
economics, jobs became dislocated from 
companies that created them. This was 
partly due to the processes of globaliza-
tion, outsourcing and offshoring, but also 
because of the feasibility of distance work, 
as enabled by modern communication 
technologies. Overall the consequences 
of distance work were evaluated as being 
very positive both for the employers and 
for the employed, not to mention envi-
ronmental effects5). The flexibility of this 
form of work allowed to employ people, 
who in the industrial system were not em-
ployable due to the long commuting time, 
and their need to be home-based because 
of disability or family obligations. It was 
feared that these people could not be suf-
ficiently disciplined and controlled at 
work. The results of the CISCO study led 
to opposite conclusions. 
With the appearance of new types of 
economic activity, the scope of knowl-
edge and creative economy increased to 
the point of making a difference in the 
organization of work. This postindustrial 
work needs to be very flexible in terms of 
working hours and working conditions, 
levels of work discipline and degree of su-
pervision, coordination and face-to-face 
contact with other employees and man-
agement. 
The initial worry was whether the 
shift to distance working would make 
work from home to be uncontrollable and 
distracted, therefore less productive. The 
data, which is flowing from research on 
work in the creative economy, shows that 
the contrary is true: typical workweeks of 
60 to 70 hours and a great degree of in-
trinsic motivation are being observed. We 
may thus generalize that this flexibiliza-
tion of work has had a one-sided effect: 
longer working hours, work at odd hours 
of the day and night, depending on indi-
vidual preferences and capabilities. 
One of the explanations for such de-
velopments is the fact that creative work 
cannot be switched on and off like the 
production belt in a factory. What is more 
likely is an analogy between creative work 
and phases of sleep, through which we 
must go in order to get its full effects13). 
The behavior of people who are work-
ing longer hours is difficult to predict as 
consumers. When they feel exhausted by 
their work they may seek entertainment 
and life’s pleasures at two of three in the 
morning, when most of the city services 
are asleep. Longer working hours also 
mean that these people have no time to 
do their shopping, look after their chil-
dren or elderly parents, to cook and to 
go through various household obligations 
at times compatible with “normal hours” 
(i.e. mainstream) under industrialism’s 
temporal regime. 
The flexibilization of postindustrial 
work means that the service providers 
have to reorganize the way they offer their 
services, to deal with this 24/7 economy. 
This gives a new sense to the term service 
economy. It is an economy, which has 
to take serve the needs of people in the 
knowledge and creative sector who work 
at unpredictable hours, dictated only by 
their rhythm of creativity.
However, as noted by Florida, the new 
companies which employ ‘creatives’ try 
to provide them with all sorts of sophis-
ticated services, in order for their employ-
ees not to disrupt their cycles of creativ-
ity: among the new perks one finds (on 
company premises) fine restaurants with 
French chefs, laundry services, kindergar-
tens, massages, fitness centers, health ser-
vices, beds and concierge services10). The 
idea is to send the following message to 
the company’s creatives: you don’t need 
to go home; you have here everything 
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you need. In places like Google you can 
bring your dog to the office, along with 
your surfing gear and favorite music. It 
is also interesting to note that these new 
companies recognize the right of creative 
people to work on their own projects. In 
Google up to 20% of work time can be 
devoted to own projects. Google lets its 
employees spend one day each work week 
focusing on their own projects, a practice 
that's delivered 50% of Google's offerings, 
including Gmail. 
Flexibilization of workplace, work 
style and dress code
Other than the flexibilization of work 
time, these companies also had to rethink 
the way they organize office space to pro-
vide best conditions for creativity. One 
of the developments was to make inte-
rior decoration of offices to be the matter 
of personal choices of people who work 
there. Thus, a far-reaching personaliza-
tion of offices took place, instead of mak-
ing them all a reflection of the corporate 
image. Offices began to look more like 
homes. The function of these offices also 
changed. They were not so much the place 
of work, as the place of contact with other 
co-workers. Their function was to facili-
tate contact and exchange of ideas, there-
fore offices became more like open spaces 
encouraging flows of people and discus-
sions. How different it is from the days 
when the layout of offices reflected corpo-
rate hierarchy, and the need to supervise 
supposedly lazy and unruly employees!
Other consequences of shifting from 
presence-based to task-based work in-
cluded radical liberalization, if not abol-
ishment, of dress codes. Professional 
groups, such as software programmers, 
specifically write it down in their work 
contracts, that they cannot be forced to 
wear a suit and to go to meetings with 
customers (they see it as waste of time, 
during which they could do something 
they are best at – writing code). Inciden-
tally, this new type of work makes every 
work contract unique, because the ‘crea-
tives’ are unique individuals and have dif-
ferent requirements / expectations from 
their employees. Offering unique talents 
and qualifications, they have a relatively 
strong position when bargaining for work 
terms of their choice17).
This new kind of creative labor is 
highly individualistic, but it invests heav-
ily in the condition of the mind and body, 
as these are their main assets on the job 
market. What matters of these groups is 
their reputation among their peer groups, 
which may mean much more to them 
than the numbers, which appeared on 
their paycheck21).
Struggle to attract the creative 
class 
With the rise of the knowledge and 
creative sector, international competitive-
ness assumes a new dimension. Its sense 
is in the ability to attract talent to a given 
city, region or country. In other words, 
staying competitive is being able to at-
tract the creative class from all over the 
world and to provide an atmosphere of 
tolerance, diversity and stimulating work 
for these people8). From the perspective 
of retaining such a creative workforce, 
places also have to provide a stimulating 
environment, with good education facili-
ties, fine gastronomy and an interesting 
cultural nightlife for long working crea-
tive class. Such places were able to form 
clusters of creativity, which made them 
less vulnerable to economic downturns, 
unemployment and gave them overall 
higher growth rates.
Despite the ongoing processes of de-
location and offshoring, in the creative 
sectors one also notes the concentration 
of high-paying professional work and 
the clustering of highly educated highly 
skilled workers. Cities such as Seattle, 
San Francisco, Austin and Boston have 
the concentration of college graduates 
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to three times higher than that of Buf-
falo among people with postgraduate 
degrees, disparities are wider still11). The 
geographic sorting of people by ability 
and educational attainment on this scale 
is unprecedented. According to Florida’s 
research, states with high levels of service 
jobs, adding those with large creative class 
concentrations, had consistently higher 
levels of economic output, income, and 
innovation. These states had lower levels 
of divorce, lower levels of stress and high-
er levels of happiness. Most service jobs, 
by their very nature, are less amenable 
to global competition or to outsourcing. 
These kinds of jobs are among the most 
firmly rooted in specific places, so both 
the employers and the potential employ-
ees have little choice but to make these 
jobs more desirable and more emotionally 
and financially rewarding9).
Because of the size, diversity, and re-
gional role, large North American cities 
which act as regional hubs seem better 
buffered from the recent economic crash 
in other regions, especially manufactur-
ing-dependent areas and places where 
prosperity was based on a single factor. 
Hub cities are connected to the world 
economy and have benefited from their 
ability to attract and consolidate various 
business functions in their regions. They 
have also managed to attract young and 
highly skilled people from across the re-
gions and even from all over the country 
and the world8).
The arrival of the international crea-
tive class can be seen as a factor of gen-
trification for the region, as was the case 
with New Zealand after the international 
film community gathered there for and 
after the turning of Harry Potter movies. 
This class in also making an invaluable 
contribution to the American economy. 
Foreign inventors have become key play-
ers in American innovation. Foreign-born 
scientists make up 17% of all bachelor’s 
degree holders, 29% of Masters degree 
holders, 38% of PhD’s and nearly 1/4 of 
all scientists and engineers in the United 
States. A third and a half of all Silicon 
Valley startups during the 1990s had a 
foreign-born entrepreneur or scientist on 
their core founding team. Foreign inven-
tors have come to account for almost half 
of all the newly patented innovations in 
the United States in the last decade9). 
Lessons for business education
Over the past three decades, the US 
economy has added 28,000,014 service 
jobs and 23 million knowledge, profes-
sional, and creative jobs, compared to just 
one million in manufacturing. Routine 
service jobs still account for the single big-
gest area of employment: 45% of jobs (or 
over 60 million jobs). Creative economy 
jobs account for 31% and working-class 
jobs for 23% of the US workforce struc-
ture9). Similar data comes from studies of 
the creative sector in the EU.
 According to projections of the Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics the US will add 
15.3 million new jobs between 2008 in 
2018. Nearly all of that growth (13.8 
million jobs) will occur in creative and 
professional jobs and service administra-
tors. The US economy will shed another 
349,000 production jobs, the blue-collar 
factory jobs that were the mainstay of the 
industrial economy. With the visible de-
mise of industrialism, its desired physical 
skills such as lifting and manual dexter-
ity are fast disappearing, to be replaced by 
pattern recognition and problem solving 
and social intelligence skills such as situ-
ational sensitivity persuasiveness required 
for teambuilding. 
Arts become an important component 
of the creative economy engine. The econ-
omy as a whole benefits from considerable 
spillovers, and synergy coming from the 
arts12, 23).
These changes are pre-sensed by grad-
uates. After the last financial crisis, values 
and career orientations of Harvard gradu-
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ates are beginning to change, reflecting 
more post-material values. When these 
grads were asked in 2009 what career 
they would choose if finances were not a 
concern, the top choice was the arts, with 
60% choosing it as their dream field, fol-
lowed by public service (12.5%) and edu-
cation (12%). Less than half of this num-
ber, just 5% of grads, named finance and 
consulting, which were at the top of the 
list only a few years earlier9).
In terms of employment opportuni-
ties, there seems to be no possibility to 
return, as Florida puts it: ”from clicks 
back to bricks”9). Also from the perspec-
tive of consumer expenditures the main-
stay of industrial era spending – car pur-
chases, consumer durables – are unlikely 
to achieve their previous significance as 
much of the consumer power has been 
redirected toward more experiential pur-
chases, such as travel, wellness and fitness 
entertainment self-expression and self im-
provement. 
Harvard grads said that the ability to 
meet people and make friends was of par-
amount importance. These young people 
intuitively understand that vibrant social 
networks are key to finding jobs, mov-
ing forward in one’s career, and securing 
personal happiness. They recognize what 
psychologists of happiness have shown 
– it’s not money per se that makes you 
happy, but doing exciting work and hav-
ing fulfilling personal relationships. And 
whereas older consumers see high-quality 
schools and safe streets as key, younger 
ones rank the availability of outstanding 
colleges and universities higher3).
What’s in the demise of industrialism 
for graduates of business schools? For one 
thing: it is the paramount importance of 
flexibility as an emergent and even domi-
nant trait of today's world, work, temporal 
and spatial order, lifestyles, which needs 
to be reflected in practical and academic 
curriculum alike. Whereas the notion of 
efficiency, effectiveness and competitive-
ness seems to permeate business cultures, 
being exposed to more society-oriented 
post-materialist values and openness to 
artistic, creative, aesthetic and environ-
mental values would be an additional ad-
vantage in the present era. Grads should 
be made more aware of the new work 
schedules, including their readiness to 
serve the 24/7 economy, mix their work 
and leisure in new ways, cope with stress 
and unpredictable task-work cycles, and 
still manage to be happy and live fulfilled 
lives, while retaining (some) control over 
their time.
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